94 In part, the choice of a contract for ICCPR may reflect the prior existence of a pledge in the form of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See note 69 above. 11 See z.B. Lipson, Charles, Why are some international agreements informal? 45 Int`l Org. 495 (1991) CrossRefGoogle Scholar. 112 Lake Stevens, William K., Lessons of Rio: A New Prominence and an Effective Blandness , N.Y. Times, June 14, 1992 Google Scholar, No. 1, at 10 (“environmentalists attacked forest principles without commitment] as hopelessly weak, even a setback . . .
” ) . This view has not changed much in the last ten years. See z.B. Adebowale, Maria et al., Environment and Human Rights: A New Approach to Sustainable Development (Int`l Inst, for Env`t – Dev., May 2001), available at Google Scholar (making it known that the Rio Accords are an insufficient basis for effective control of globalization.” 150 “Many international NgRos strongly identify with environmental and human rights standards, but often suffer no direct material damage due to their violation.” Ronald B. Mitchell: Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes , 42 Int`l Stud. Q. 109, 120 (1998) Google Scholar. 134 Several efforts are under way to establish numerous data sets on international agreements and their provisions. However, these datasets almost always focus on contracts. 152 The Future of U.N. Human Rights Monitoring, supra note 36.
Oona Hathaway`s argument on human rights treaties is essentially based on easing the pressure of non-state actors on states that sign and ratify agreements, which in some cases leads to a decline in behaviour. Hathaway, Oona A., Do human rights treaties make a difference? 111 Yale L. J. 1935 (2002) CrossRefGoogle Scholar; See Goodman, Ryan – Jinks, Derek, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treatys , 14 EUR.J. Int`l L. 171 (2003) Google Scholar. 143 As Simmons states, “Governments are reluctant to make international legal commitments when there is a significant risk that they will no longer be able to meet them in the future. [The obligation is subject to conditions that can reasonably be expected to be met. Simmons, supra note 28, at 599. 68 As the Basel Committee, which negotiated the Basel and Basel II agreement, stated in Note 22 above: “The Committee does not have a formal supranational supervisory authority and its conclusions have no legal value and have never been considered” (emphasis added). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is in . 160 Andrew Guzman argues that sanctions are partly rare because they represent “a net loss to the parties – one side faces costs that are not recovered by the other.” Andrew T.
Guzman: The Design of International Agreements , 17 Eur. J. Int`l L. (2006) Google Scholar. The theoretical conundrum of why states generally do not offer compensation mechanisms under their international agreements remains to be explained. 183 Another view on the effectiveness of non-binding agreements is available under Mirmina, Steven A., Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a Legally Binding Instrument , 99 AJIL 649 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.